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ESSAY
FORD'S HIDDEN FAIRNESS DEFECT
Linda Sandstrom Simard, t CassandraBurke Robertson,tt
& Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodest t t
INTRODUCTION

A consumer saves up to buy a used car. Unbeknownst to
him, the vehicle has a design defect-and in a crash, the airbag
fails to deploy, leaving his passenger severely injured. Under
state law, the injured party has a right to sue the vehicle
manufacturer: but where? The obvious forum is the plaintiff's
home forum-it's where the owner purchased the car, the
accident happened, the injured party was hospitalized, and the
plaintiff is able to interview local attorneys with experience in
local courts.
But there's a problem-the car manufacturer didn't sell
the car in-state. It sold the car elsewhere, and the used car
dealer, or an earlier owner, brought the car into the forum state
where it was purchased by its current owner. Of course, the
car
manufacturer
conducted
other extensive
in-state
activities-it advertised its vehicles and marketed its brand, it
serviced its vehicles (new and used), and it sold similar models
in-state. But is that enough for personal jurisdiction? That
question of whether strict causation is needed for personal
jurisdiction is scheduled for argument before the United States
Supreme Court this month in consolidated cases involving
Ford Motor Company.' The Court's resolution of this issue will
significantly affect future litigation. 2 Most immediately, the
case will determine whether injured plaintiffs can access a
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1 See Docket Sheet, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 140
S.
Ct.
917
(2020)
(No.
19-368),

https:

/www. supremecourt.gov /search, aspx?filename docket /docketfiles! html

/public/19-368.htm [https://perma.cc/7D9M-M3LC].
2 See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Cassandra Burke Robertson & Linda
Sandstrom Simard, Ford's JurisdictionalCrossroads, 109 GEo. L.J. Online 102,

103 (2020).
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convenient forum in products liability cases. In the long run,
however, the case may have a broader and less obvious impact.
Specifically, even a seemingly narrow win for Ford could result
in an analytical short circuit that cuts off inquiry into the
factors that the Supreme Court once held to be primary
guarantors of "fair play and substantial justice." 3

I
THE TANGLED DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAIRNESS FACTORS

ago, International Shoe Co. v.
Seventy-five years
Washington first announced the minimum contacts test as a
tool for interpreting due process limitations on personal
jurisdiction, stating that "due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam . . . he
have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' 4 The Court linked the
concept of minimum contacts to the due process standard of
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"
explaining that when a state imposes obligations on an
out-of-state defendant that "arise out of or are connected with"
the defendant's in-state activities and obligations, "a procedure
which requires the [defendant] to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be
undue." 5
The Court later expanded on this standard, holding that a
defendant must engage in purposeful in-state conduct before
becoming subject to a state's jurisdictional power. 6 But upon
a showing that the nonresident defendant "deliberately has
engaged in significant activities within a State," the analytical
lens of the test, according to the Court, expands beyond the
defendant's forum activities and contacts to consider what
have become known as the "fairness factors." 7
These fairness factors extend the court's inquiry beyond

3 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
4 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).

5 Id. at 319.
6 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 ("When a corporation
'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State,' it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there .... " (citation omitted));
Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[I]t is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State.").
7 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985) (citation
omitted).
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merely the defendant's conduct, weighing the defendant's
litigation burdens against the plaintiff's interest in convenient
relief, the systemic efficiency of resolving the dispute in the
forum court, the forum state's underlying interest in
controversy, and the shared substantive interests of the
states. 8 These factors ensure that the interests of the other
relevant parties and institutions will be considered in resolving
the ultimate question: Does the assertion of jurisdiction
comport with "fair play and substantial justice?"9
Not surprisingly, though, confusion exists over the role of
the fairness factors. Even though it's been nearly a century
and a half since the Supreme Court first explained that the
Due Process Clause limits the states' exercise of personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants,1 0 and even though
the
Supreme
Court has never wavered
from
that
understanding in all the decades since, the Court has still
failed to articulate a consistent explanation of the underlying
interests protected by the doctrine. From an emphasis on state
power in Pennoyer v. Neff," to "traditionalnotions of fair play
and substantial justice" in International Shoe,1 2 to sovereignty
and convenience
in World-Wide
Volkswagen
Corp.
v.
Woodson,1 3 to the defendant's liberty interest in Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,1 4 to
the protection of horizontal federalism in Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Superior Court,1 5 the Court's rationale for imposing limits

8 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
9 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 ("Once it has been decided that a defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial
justice.' (citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320)).
10 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
11 Id. at 720 ("The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established.").
12 326 U.S. at 316.
13 444 U.S. at 291-92 ("The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be
seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions.
It protects the
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system.").
14 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) ("The personal jurisdiction requirement
recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction
on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty.").
15 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1776, 1780 (2017) (concluding that the "federalism
interest may be decisive," in some cases and that personal jurisdiction protects
"the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may
have little legitimate interest in the claims in question").
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on state court authority has circled around a variety of
interests without
settling on a coherent
framework
incorporating these interests together.16
Even without consistency from the Supreme Court,
however, lower courts largely converged around a familiar
three-part test for defendants not "at home" in the forum
pieced together from the Court's decisions: (1) purposeful
forum contacts by the defendant; (2) a nexus between the
contacts and the litigation; and (3) a "reasonableness check"
evaluating the fairness factors.1 7 Taking a cue from Justice
William Brennan's approach in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz,1 8 though, lower courts did not always attempt to
keep the three parts of the test conceptually separated;
instead, when jurisdiction was a close question, the courts
would often look to the fairness factors in the third prong to
inform the court's analysis. 19

16 For a sampling of the literature on the Court's shifting rationales, see
generally Ray Worthy Campbell, PersonalJurisdiction and National Sovereignty,
77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97, 144-56 (2020); Allan Erbsen, Wayfair Undermines
Nicastro: The ConstitutionalConnection Between State Tax Authority and Personal
Jurisdiction, 128 YALE L.J.F. 724 (2019); Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid
PersonalJurisdiction:It's Not General Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction,But Is
It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 559, 582-95 (1998); Adam Steinman,
The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.
v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 496-504 (2012).
17 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126-27, 139 n.20 (2014)
(recognizing specific jurisdiction requires in-state activities by the nonresident
defendant that are related to the litigation, subject to a "multipronged
reasonableness check").
18 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) ("These [fairness] considerations sometimes
serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required.").
19 See, e.g., Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 210 (1st Cir.
1994) (recognizing that "an especially strong showing of reasonableness may
serve to fortify a borderline showing of relatedness and purposefulness"); Madara
v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Having determined that [the
defendant's]
contacts
with
Florida
are
insufficient
to
establish
constitutionally-required minimum contacts, we now look to other considerations
outlined by the Supreme Court. . . . [that] may in exceptional cases serve to
establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum
contacts than would otherwise be required."); Haisten v. Grass Valley Med.
Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing
"jurisdictionmay be exercised with a lesser showing of minimum contact than
would otherwise be required if considerations of reasonableness dictate" (citing
BurgerKing, 471 U.S. 475-76)); Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc., 566
F. Supp. 2d 933, 945 (N.D. Iowa 2008) ("In a case like this, where the minimum
contacts are at least questionable concerning physical contacts, it is prudent to
analyze whether exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
would 'offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' (quoting
Int'l Shoe)), aff'd, 607 F.3d 515 (8th Cir. 2010); Nat'l Petroleum Mktg., Inc. v.
Phoenix Fuel Co., 902 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (D. Utah 1995) (opining that earlier
case from the Tenth Circuit "appears to subscribe to the proposition that libel
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Judicial analysis of the fairness factors thus came to play
two important roles: it allowed courts to steer litigation away
from inappropriate forums, acting as a kind of forum non
conveniens analysis, 20 and it also bolstered decisions in close
cases to avoid dismissal when the interests weighed heavily in
favor of the forum state. 2 1 The first role made sure that cases
weren't heard in an inappropriate forum, and the second role
helped to keep cases in an appropriate one. The second of
those two roles is now at risk.
II
HOW FORD'S ARGUMENT SHORT-CIRCUITS THE JURISDICTIONAL
ANALYSIS

Ford argues that a defendant who engages in purposeful
conduct aimed at a forum state may only be subject to personal
jurisdiction for obligations that are proximately caused by that
conduct. 22 Courts have long held, of course, that when a
defendant engages in purposeful conduct aimed at a forum
state and that conduct gives rise to litigation, the exercise of
jurisdiction almost always comports with fair play and
substantial justice. 23 But even though a causal nexus presents

claims, in contrast to business tort claims, are ones for which 'considerations [of
fair play and substantial justice] sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness
of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise
be required.' (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477));
Quikrete Cos. v. Nomix Corp., 705 F. Supp. 568, 573 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (explaining
that the "prongs of the Burger King test, minimum contacts and fairness, are
designed to work together to establish or deny jurisdiction. A strong showing of
either can compensate for a lesser showing of the other."); Mahon v. E. Moline
Metal Prods., 579 A.2d 255, 256-57 (Me. 1990) (holding jurisdiction appropriate
after analyzing fairness factors and concluding that such "considerations
'sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser
showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required. ' (quoting
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477)); Beckers v. Seck, 14 S.W.3d 139, 144 (Mo. App.
2000) ("Considering the set of facts here and these five factors, this court holds
that the nature and quality of appellant's acts 'serve to establish the
reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than
would otherwise be required.' (quoting BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 477)).
20 See Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
390, 434 (2017) (noting that the fairness factors "overlap significantly with forum
non conveniens.").
21 See, e.g., Wells Dairy, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (employing fairness factors
to buttress holding on "questionable" existence of minimum contacts); Mahon,
579 A.2d at 256-57 (holding jurisdiction appropriate based on fairness-factor
evaluation); Beckers, 14 S.W.3d at 144 (analyzing fairness factors to bolster
defendant's amenability).
22 Brief for Petitioner at 11, 24-25, Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial
Dist. Ct., 140 S. Ct. 917 (2020) (No. 19-368), 2020 WL 1154744.
23 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (stating that under such circumstances
defendant must make a "compelling case" to avoid jurisdiction).
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a particularly strong justification for jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court has never held that it is the only scenario that justifies
a state's assertion of specific personal jurisdiction. To the
contrary, the Court has repeatedly described the required
nexus in terms of obligations that arise out of, relate to, or are
connected with, a defendant's purposeful forum contacts. 24
The Court's recent narrowing of jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers
Squibb, however, created an opening for Ford to argue in favor
of a more limited nexus standard requiring causation. 25
On its face, Ford's argument appears narrow-it doesn't
directly challenge the fairness factors, instead only raising the
question of nexus. But if Ford's argument is adopted, the
nexus requirement will weigh the defendant's interest so
strongly that courts will rarely be permitted to address the
fairness factors at all. Currently, when jurisdiction appears to
be a close case, courts engage in a "multi-factored
reasonableness check" using the fairness factors to determine
if the exercise of jurisdiction in a particular context is
unreasonable. 26 Under Ford's preferred test, by contrast, the
jurisdictional analysis would end if the defendant's contacts
are not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's claim, making the
reasonableness check irrelevant.
A causation requirement
would thus short-circuit the jurisdictional analysis, so that the
interests of the plaintiff, the states, and the court system itself
would no longer play a role in directing litigation to an
appropriate forum.
Not only would Ford's test exclude the interests of the
other players in determining the reasonableness of the forum
when causation isn't satisfied, but it would allow the defendant
to raise the interests of other parties in an attempt to escape
jurisdiction when causation is satisfied. Thus, for example,
when the defendant's in-state action directly causes harm, the
defendant could argue that the state's interest isn't strong
enough to support jurisdiction or that the plaintiff could more
conveniently sue elsewhere. But when the causation element

24
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (holding that a
state can exercise specific jurisdiction when the suit is "connected with" the
defendant's in-state activities); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117,
127 (2014) (describing specific jurisdiction over a suit that is "relat[ed] to" the
defendant's forum activities); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 ("relate[d] to");
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n.8 (1984)
("related to").
25 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 14.
26 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20 (suggesting that a "multipronged
reasonableness check" is relevant to a determination of specific jurisdiction
(citing BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 476-78)).
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isn't satisfied, the plaintiff would be precluded from relying on
even a strong state interest or an inability to conveniently
access the courts of another state to support jurisdiction.
Ford's test would thus allow the fairness factors to be wielded
as a one-way ratchet. Instead of protecting the interests of the
other players, the fairness factors would protect only the
defendant. 27
III
SHORT-CIRCUITING THE FAIRNESS FACTORS UNDERMINES
JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES

The Supreme Court's recent personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence has already taken a formalist turn that
minimizes the import of the fairness factors.
The Court's
retrenchment of general jurisdiction in DaimlerAG v. Bauman28
in favor of a largely mechanical determination of the
defendant's home forum extinguished the prevailing lower
court approach that applied the fairness factors to general
jurisdiction. 29 In specific jurisdiction cases, the Court has
narrowed both the minimum contacts prong and the nexus
prong in ways that foreclose jurisdiction even in cases where
the fairness factors weigh heavily in favor ofjurisdiction. 30 This
narrow formalism has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to
sue in their home forums (or even, in some cases, within their
home countries), 31 and has limited the power of federal courts

27 Cf. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474 ("[Tihe Due Process Clause may not
readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have
been voluntarily assumed.").
28 571 U.S. at 137 ("For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise
of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home."
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924

(2011)).
29 Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonarato FairPlayand SubstantialJustice?, 63 S.C.
L. Rev. 745, 759 (2012) (explaining that "[m]any lower federal courts, without
guidance let alone direction from the Supreme Court, started to apply
second-branch fairness factors to assertions of general jurisdiction."); accord
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV. 807, 899-902 (2004) (discussing prevailing lower court approach to and
underlying rationales supporting applying fairness factors to general
jurisdiction).
30 See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1, 24-25 (2018); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson,
A New State RegistrationAct: Legislating a Longer Arm for Personal Jurisdiction,
57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 377, 394-400 (2020).
31 As Professor Childress has pointed out, this formalist approach has
created an odd situation where, in Nicastro, "the most-concerned state was not
the United Kingdom, where the Nicastro case would have had to be filed under
the Court's approach, but the State of New Jersey." Donald Earl Childress III,
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to allow the joinder of related claims, so that products liability
actions in many cases must now go forward in multiple states
at once. 32

A further retreat into formalism-and thus a continued
retreat from the fairness factors-risks undermining the due
process foundations of the doctrine. The defendant's liberty
interest is part of that due process foundation; the defendant,
after all, risks the regulation of its conduct, the restraint of its
activities, and the potential deprivation of its property from the
state's authority to render a binding judgment through judicial
proceedings. 33 But the defendant's interest is only one part of
the due process fabric. Procedural due process requires a
balancing of the underlying interests-public as well as
private.34
This means plaintiffs have significant due process
interests of their own. The plaintiff's loss of rights or property
is not merely a speculative concern for the future. Instead, the
plaintiff is seeking judicial redress now for an injury that has
already happened. 35 Access to the judicial system is the heart
of the plaintiff's due process interest. The personal jurisdiction
analysis, however, has traditionally focused on the defendant's
interest rather than the plaintiff's-likely because the courts
historically gave significant deference to the plaintiff's choice
of forum.
Now that the Supreme Court has reduced that
deference and limited the range of available forums, there is a
greater risk that plaintiffs will be shut out of court if their due

Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of TransnationalPersonal Jurisdiction,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1555 (2013). As a result, it is entirely possible that
if the plaintiff injured in New Jersey were to file suit in the United Kingdom, then
the foreign court may well apply New Jersey law in any case. Id.
32 See, e.g., Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1315-22 (11th Cir.
2018) (dismissing one defendant, Union Carbide, on jurisdictional grounds in
multi-defendant mesothelioma lawsuit because the plaintiff was not exposed to
Union Carbide's products in the forum, even though Union Carbide conducted
substantial, ongoing in-state business activities).
33 See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and
PersonalJurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 604-10 (2007) (detailing defendants'
liberty interests implicated in state jurisdictional assertions).
34
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976);see Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Due Process in the American Identity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 255, 263 (2012)
(recognizing due process involves "an interest-balancing approach to determine
what process is due in a particular case").
35 See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a
Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1636-40 (2004) ("The
due process guarantees in the federal constitution protect fundamental rights
against arbitrary abridgement. The right to a remedy is one of these fundamental
rights historically recognized in our legal system as central to the concept of
ordered liberty." (footnote omitted)).
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process

interests are not explicitly considered in the
jurisdictional analysis. 36
The other three fairness factors focus on systemic and
institutional interests rather than party interests, but they are
likewise essential to a due process analysis. 37 The Court in
InternationalShoe recognized that due process included these
public interests, writing that personal jurisdiction should be
evaluated "in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which . . . [is] the purpose of the due process clause
to insure." 38 The due process analysis requires a balancing of
concerns and defies the mechanical application of bright-line
rules. As the Court has written, in another context, "due
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands." 39
The systemic fairness factors offer a way to incorporate
essential procedural protections by helping to steer litigation
to a forum where the underlying interests can be fully and
fairly heard.
Providing deference to the state's regulatory
interest ensures that states are able to enforce their laws and
protect their citizens-a fundamental aspect of our federalist
system. 40 Steering litigation to an efficient forum where related
claims can be joined saves both party and taxpayer money, and
it reduces the risk of duplicative litigation and the attendant
risks of inconsistent verdicts that undermine trust in the
judicial system. 4 1 Examining the substantive interests of the
several states (and even of foreign states, as in Asaht) protects
horizontal federalism interests in domestic litigation and
applies traditional notions of comity in transnational

36 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 478
(1985)
("[Jlurisdictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to make litigation
'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a party unfairly is at a 'severe
disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent." (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972))
37 Stravitz, supra note 29, at 764 ("The concept of fair and orderly
administration of the law is not solely limited to fairness to defendants.
Consequently, the sovereign interest of a forum state in administering its laws,
and fair play to all parties, including plaintiffs, must logically and inherently be
considered if due process is to be accorded.").
38 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
39
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see also Connecticut v.
Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) ("These cases 'underscore the truism that "[d]ue
process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.').
40 See Rhodes, Robertson & Simard, supra note 2.
41 See Dodson, supra note 30, at 3-5 (detailing the "burdens, inefficiencies,
and potential unfairness of individualized litigation" as compared to aggregated
claims involving common issues).
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litigation.42
If these factors are relegated to mere "context" and made
relevant only after (and if) the plaintiff successfully traverses a
narrow jurisdiction test focused only on the defendant's liberty
interest, then these larger due process interests will no longer
be protected.
In the Ford case, for example, where can
plaintiffs sue if they buy a car on the second-hand market and
its defect leads to a serious accident? Not in their home state,
if Ford didn't sell that particular vehicle there. Possibly in the
state where Ford originally sold the car when new-but that
state would have only a tenuous connection to the litigation.
The state of first sale is almost certain to be a mere fortuity.
It may be that the only forum realistically available is the
manufacturer's home state. In a domestic case, it may be
feasible for some plaintiffs to sue in the defendant's home-as
long as they have the resources to litigate outside their own
home state.
In a transnational case, the hurdle will be
significantly higher. Few plaintiffs will be equipped to sue in a
foreign country over products they bought in their home state.
And what if the plaintiffs want to join other parties in the
suit-for example, allowing the injured passenger to sue the
driver as well as the manufacturer?
In products cases,
component parts are also often at issue-it may not be clear
whether the defect arose from a defective airbag, defective tires,
or some other part of the product. With the possible forum

choices so limited, it is likely that the plaintiff will not find a
forum where all possible defendants can be joined in a single
action. The plaintiff may need to sue the vehicle manufacturer
in Michigan (or Korea), the tire manufacturer in Ohio (or
Japan), and the driver in the parties' home state.
Of course, the doctrine of personal jurisdiction cannot
ensure an ideal forum. But at the very least, the doctrine
should not hinder the search for one. And yet that is likely to
be the consequence if the Supreme Court continues to narrow
the focus of the personal jurisdiction test, apply a formalist
inquiry focused exclusively on the defendant's interest, and
minimize the remaining fairness factors to the point of
nonexistence. The Roberts Court is not always comfortable
with a wide-ranging due process analysis; instead, it deals
better with clear rules and bright-line tests. 4 3 Nevertheless, as

42

See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,

114-15

(1987).
43
See Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. "Rocky' Rhodes, The
Business of PersonalJurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 775, 788-90 (2017).
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other scholars have pointed out, a degree of disruption and
uncertainty is "the price of a constitutional right that is defined
its
flexibility
and
responsiveness
to
changing
by

circumstances." 4 4
CONCLUSION

Ford asserts that a strict causation-based nexus
requirement will simplify the minimum contacts test. But the
Due Process Clause has never been about simplicity. It is
about fairness and reasonableness. Rather than falling for the
illusion of simplicity, the Court should recognize that the
minimum contacts test is a tool for determining when the
exercise of jurisdiction meets "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice," a determination that is inherently
complex.
Indeed, the Court long ago recognized that the
personal jurisdiction "determination is one in which few
answers will be written in 'black and white. The greys are
dominant
and
even
among them
the
shades
are
innumerable. "'45 The Court should not silently relegate the
fairness factors to the dustbin of history in the illusory pursuit
of simplicity because these factors protect important interests
in the due process analysis.

44 Jason Parkin, Dialogic Due Process, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1115, 1158-59
(2019).
45 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).

